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The Miami Summit launching the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) process recognized that free 
markets and free societies work best when they work together. The core labor standards—freedom of 
association and the right to organize and bargain collectively, freedom from forced labor, the abolition of 
child labor, and freedom from discrimination—are part of the summit-FTAA process because they 
strengthen both markets and democracy. These core standards are broadly recognized as fundamental 
rights to which all workers are entitled, regardless of the level of development of the country or the sector 
where they work. And, in an environment that promotes democracy and market-oriented economies, as 
the FTAA is intended to do, there is no trade-off between these principles and development; indeed, they 
become mutually reinforcing.  
At a time when the importance of social institutions in development has been widely recognized, 
the real debate is over how and with what urgency to promote the core labor standards. In this debate the 
questions include whether universal means uniform and what that implies for development. And, of 
course, the central question is whether implementation and enforcement of global labor standards should 
be explicitly linked to trade agreements. The paper begins with the case for global labor standards as not 
just politically necessary but as substantively complementary to economic integration in the hemisphere. 
It then summarizes the situation with respect to implementation of the core labor standards in the 
hemisphere. It also reviews recent developments in the treatment of labor issues in trade agreements and 
assesses the various options for addressing labor issues in the FTAA.  
Two sets of issues—not addressed in detail in this paper—should be mentioned. First, the 
implications of the FTAA for workers obviously go far beyond standards issues. Important policy issues 
related to the need for adjustment assistance and safety nets are addressed elsewhere (see, for example, 
Lustig and López Calva 2002 and Ocampo and Bustillo 2002) and are mentioned only in passing here. 
The second issue not treated extensively is the potential use of trade sanctions to enforce labor standards 
in trade agreements. In chapter 4 of Can Labor Standards Improve Under Globalization? (2003), authors 
Kimberly Ann Elliott and Richard Freeman review the evidence on sanctions effectiveness and on the 
probability of protectionist capture. They concluded that trade measures could be designed to contribute 
to improved compliance with labor standards in discrete situations while also guarding against 
protectionist abuse. They recommended a limited role for the WTO in disciplining trade-related 
violations of core labor standards but concur with those who argue that the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) should have the principal role in promoting and enforcing international labor 
standards generally. 
The reason for not repeating those arguments here is that the recent pattern of bilateral and 
regional negotiations suggests that the push to include enforceable labor standards in trade agreements has  
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shifted from the dead-end track of non-negotiability to a track of nominal success but practical futility. 
Although recent trade agreements between the United States and Jordan, Singapore, and Chile include 
enforceable labor standards provisions, they seem to be aimed primarily at finding procedurally elegant 
and politically acceptable trade-labor mechanisms that permit trade agreements to proceed. They are a 
useful precedent supporting the importance of labor standards, but it is not yet clear whether they will 
give a meaningful boost to improved compliance. Moreover, negotiating obstacles are likely to remain a 
bar to progress at the broader regional level.  
Thus, the paper concludes with suggestions for a way forward that uses a parallel track to 
negotiate labor issues but that also links progress in those negotiations more closely to the trade 
negotiations than usually contemplated.
1 The problem with parallel tracks is that, absent an explicit 
political commitment or linkage, there is nothing to guarantee that the trains on the two tracks move at 
similar speeds. Indeed, advocates of labor standards suspect that the practical effect will be to allow the 
free trade train to move ahead while the labor standards train remains stuck in the station. Addressing that 
concern is the key to breaking the impasse over trade and labor standards in the hemisphere and 
elsewhere. 
 
I. WHY GLOBALIZATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND LABOR STANDARDS GO TOGETHER 
 
There is relatively little controversy over the importance of three of the four core standards. No one is in 
favor of forced labor, and discrimination on a broad range of grounds is also rejected as morally 
unacceptable. Moreover, gender discrimination is now widely recognized as detrimental to both economic 
and social development (World Bank 2001). The summit process also recognizes the particular needs and 
vulnerabilities of indigenous peoples throughout the hemisphere, who are often marginalized and unable 
to reap the benefits of globalization. The abolition of child labor is more controversial, but on pragmatic, 
not principled grounds—no one disagrees on the goal, just on how to get there and at what speed. There is 
also broad agreement that countries should move quickly to eliminate the “worst forms” of child labor, as 
defined in the new ILO convention 182.
2 
The real heat is generated by the right to freedom of association and associated union rights and 
the push to link compliance with core labor standards to negotiation of the FTAA. But promoting social 
dialogue, including with unions, can make economic reforms more acceptable and sustainable. 
                                                 
1 For a similar proposal addressing environmental issues in the FTAA negotiations, see Audley and Sherwin (2002); 
for an alternative proposal suggesting delinking trade and labor negotiations, see Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace (2001). 
2 These include forced labor, recruitment of child soldiers, illicit activities such as drug-trafficking, prostitution, and 
pornography, and “other hazardous” work to be defined by each country adhering to the convention.  
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International enforcement of labor standards can also help prevent races to the bottom from the bottom, 
particularly for relatively more progressive countries that find themselves competing with other low-wage 
but weak or nondemocratic countries. Attention to labor standards issues can also address concerns of the 
critics—in both developed and developing countries—that economic globalization today is unbalanced, 
disproportionately favoring capital over labor and other social groups. 
 
Freedom of Association under Globalization 
The ambivalence (or hostility) regarding unions derives in part from the examples in Latin America and 
elsewhere of politically powerful and monopolistic trade unions living up to the caricature of corrupt, 
elitist, rent-seeking entities that are interested mainly in protecting their insider advantages at the expense 
of outsiders. But of course, the same can be said of firms and politicians in countries where this is true. 
The appropriate response in these cases is the same for unions as for corrupt firms and politicians: expose 
them to competition and ensure that they are accountable to stakeholders. Globalization and 
democratization help promote the “voice face” of unions, which can reduce conflicts, improve 
productivity, and make globalization and the reform process more inclusive (Freeman and Medoff 1984). 
In addition, a World Bank survey of evidence on the effects of unions shows that coordinated bargaining 
can help small, open economies adjust to economic shocks more quickly and at a lower cost (Aidt and 
Tzannatos 2002). Evidence in the study also supports the intuition that more competitive product markets 
constrain the market of unions, as they do of firms. But unions can still play a useful role in this 
environment in improving working conditions for workers, settling grievances, and providing other 
services such as training or job placement assistance. 
Improved “voice” mechanisms are also essential in sustaining and expanding needed reforms in 
the region. Currently, labor market regulations in many Latin American countries make it difficult or 
expensive to hire and fire workers. Simply doing away with these regulations has proved politically 
difficult and, where progress has been made, it has often produced a backlash against reforms.
3 Moreover, 
because economic growth in the region has not responded as expected to liberalizing reforms, workers 
often find that flexibility for employers means increased risk for them—without the promised increases in 
employment or a safety net to fall back on.
4 In addition to expanding and strengthening safety nets where 
needed, strengthening the institutions of social dialogue are a complement to reforms to increase labor 
market flexibility. In addition to giving workers a voice in the reform process, strengthened association 
                                                 
3 Navia and Velasco (2003, figure 3) note that labor market reforms have barely begun in most of the region; see 
also Saavedra (2003). 
4 See Saavedra (2003) for an analysis of the labor market trends in Latin America during the recent period of 
structural reforms, as well as recommendations for changes in policy; also see Lustig and López Calva (2002) and 
Ocampo and Bustillo (2002).  
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and bargaining rights enable workers to negotiate to protect their own interests, without having to resort 
to detailed, interventionist government regulation. In sum, labor market reforms are likely to be more 
effective and less painful if they are undertaken in the context of a comprehensive “decent work” program 
that addresses all four of the pillars targeted by the ILO: employment, standards, social protection, and 
social dialogue (Somavia 1999). 
In addition, the role workers can play in monitoring labor standards needs to be strengthened. The 
primary problem in most countries is not the law but the lack of capacity to enforce it, a problem that has 
grown worse with the need for fiscal rectitude. Workers are on the job every day and are thus in the best 
position to monitor compliance with labor standards, whether incorporated in voluntary codes of conduct, 
collective bargaining agreements, or government regulations. Governments, employers, and multinational 
corporations sourcing in developing countries should think of unions as a cost-effective mechanism for 
responding to the pressures from civil society for more monitoring and verification of labor standards, 
particularly in developing countries where government capacity is limited.
5 
 
Making Standards Global 
The question remains, however, whether there is any reason for global promotion and enforcement of 
labor standards. First, while there is little evidence of the feared race to the bottom from the top, a race to 
the bottom from the bottom is more plausible, especially in highly price-competitive and footloose sectors 
like footwear and, especially, apparel. But this is not inevitable, especially where democracy and social 
institutions are strong, and some countries are beginning to promote good labor standards as a 
competitive advantage in attracting multinational corporations with strong brand identities and an interest 
in “reputation insurance.”  
A second rationale for giving higher priority to global labor standards is that political support for 
the current system of global economic governance is increasingly undermined by the perception that it is 
unbalanced. Rules protecting trade, capital flows, and intellectual property have progressed much further 
and faster than rules to protect workers or the environment. If this lack of public enthusiasm in developed 
countries for multilateral rules and reciprocal negotiations on integration further erodes political support 
for the international trade system, it is developing countries that will suffer most. 
Progressive, democratic developing countries might even want to strengthen international 
enforcement of labor standards to resolve potential collective action problems if a race to the bottom is 
occurring. Chau and Kanbur (2000) have developed a theoretical model showing how a “race to the 
bottom from the bottom” can develop, particularly among small countries that cannot affect their terms of 
trade. This should not be interpreted as meaning that higher labor standards undermine comparative 
                                                 
5 Saavedra (2003) also makes recommendations for reforming the collective bargaining process.   
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advantage and Chau and Kanbur note that this dynamic depends on a variety of factors and is not 
inevitable.
6 For example, Costa Rica, when faced with increasing competition in traditional low-wage 
sectors, advertised its political stability and high literacy rates to attract foreign investment in electronics 
and other higher valued-added sectors. In other words, Costa Rica chose to opt out of the race to the 
bottom and was able to do so. Cross-country studies also do not show that countries that have low labor 
standards necessarily grow faster and most show a negative correlation between the level of labor 
standards and inward foreign direct investment (Rodrik 1996, Morici and Schulz 2001, Kucera 2001).  
But not all countries are as stable, democratic, and relatively well-educated as Costa Rica. And 
repression of labor standards under some circumstances can give a competitive advantage—or the 
perception of such an advantage—to a particular firm or sector. Some studies find correlations between 
various measures of low standards and textile and apparel exports by low-wage countries, but these 
results are not robust and other studies find no effect on labor costs (Rodrik 1996; Morici and Schulz 
2001; Kucera 2001; and Elliott and Freeman 2003, chapter 1, for a survey). Yet some countries and 
employers clearly behave as if they believe that improved compliance with labor standards, particularly 
freedom of association, would threaten their growth or profit. Bangladesh, Pakistan, Panama, and a few 
other countries explicitly restrict organizing or bargaining rights in export sectors or zones.
 7 Problems in 
practice are far more widespread, and officials from some countries concede privately that foreign 
investors threaten not to invest there if they have to deal with unions (ILO 2002, 7).  
Nevertheless, with regard to trade negotiations, former Costa Rican Trade Minister Jose Manuel 
Salazar-Xirinachs (2003, 336) argues that most developing countries are more interested in addressing the 
continuing imbalances they face in market access and regard debates over labor, the environment, and 
other new issues as diversions from this core priority. But the growing backlash in Latin America and 
elsewhere against “Washington consensus” reforms suggests that concerns about imbalances related to 
globalization are not restricted to developed countries. In order to rebuild support for trade liberalization 
and other market-oriented reforms, governments need to address labor and social issues as well. And 
developing countries also have an interest in avoiding further backlash against such agreements and 
against the multilateral trade system more broadly among consumers and voters in the United States, 
Canada, and elsewhere.  
                                                 
6 For example, the key assumption underlying the Chau and Kanbur model is that higher standards must raise costs 
and adversely affects exports. But, in practice, unions might raise productivity enough to offset the wage premium 
union members usually receive. Whether discrimination promotes or undermines exports depends on whether it 
occurs in the traded or nontraded sector. 
7 There are signs of progress, however. After years of pressure from the US government, the ILO, and others, 
Bangladesh announced that it would permit union activity in EPZs beginning in January 2004 (Chau and Kanbur 
2000).  
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In addition to the diversion argument, and despite generally positive rhetoric about the legitimacy 
of the core labor standards, concerns remain that the push for global standards is a misguided attempt to 
force inappropriate developed-country labor institutions on less developed countries (Salazar 2003, 319). 
On this, useful lessons on how not to address labor issues in the context of trade agreements may be 
found in the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 
Similar to the ILO, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is a specialized UN agency with 
roots going back more than a century. But, like many worker organizations today, corporations producing 
intellectual property-rich products regarded it as too weak to protect their interests and wanted to 
incorporate stronger and globally consistent rules in the World Trade Organization, with trade sanctions 
to enforce them. The approach taken by Uruguay Round negotiators, who opted for broadly uniform 
minimum rules on intellectual property, stands in contrast to the consensus on international labor 
standards, which emphasizes principles that are universally applicable but that leave broad scope for 
national diversity in implementation.
8 Contrary to what many assume, the legal conventions that are the 
basis for implementing the core standards also leave substantial room for national differences; they do not 
prescribe any particular set of industrial relations institutions. Even with respect to issues such as 
minimum wages that cause the most concern among developing countries, ILO conventions focus on the 
process, the “wage-setting machinery,” not the outcome (what the wage should be in any particular case).  
Before it was even fully implemented, criticisms arose that the TRIPS agreement was 
inappropriate for poor countries that do not have intellectual property owners to protect and who would be 
forced to transfer millions of dollars annually in royalties and monopoly prices to rich-country firms. In 
order to come into compliance, these countries could also be forced to spend scarce resources to pass new 
legislation and to create the enforcement capacity needed to implement it. Spurred in particular by the 
AIDS crisis in Africa, the agreement is currently being renegotiated to make it more flexible and to 
recognize the special needs of less developed countries. This experience would seem to underscore the 
need to focus more narrowly on the truly trade-related aspects of nontraditional issues and to pay more 
attention than in the past to the need for technical assistance and financial transfers to developing 
countries to help them implement increasingly complex international agreements. Thus, TRIPS is not a 
good model for how to include labor standards in trade agreements but the arguments used in promoting 
it—fairness and ethical concerns, the weakness of the WIPO, the need for an agreement with “teeth”—
make it far harder to argue that labor (and environmental) standards have no role at all in trade 
agreements, especially when violations are trade-related.  
                                                 
8 The TRIPs agreement provides for some flexibility in implementation—longer phase-ins for developing countries 
and limited opt-outs in the form of compulsory licenses in emergencies—but the basic rules are the same for all 
WTO members, despite widely differing circumstances.  
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There are other pragmatic political economy arguments for paying attention to labor standards in 
the FTAA process. Large majorities of survey respondents in the United States say they think trade 
agreements should include minimum labor standards and that they would avoid buying goods if they 
knew they were made under bad conditions. The US Congress also included labor issues as a principal 
negotiating objective when it passed “trade promotion authority” in August 2002, and it seems unlikely 
that even a majority-Republican Congress will be able to ratify an FTAA without any reference to labor 
standards. 
Most governments in Latin America support labor standards in principle but oppose including 
them in trade agreements with sanctions to enforce them out of fear they might be manipulated to restrict 
exports. The experience with American antidumping and countervailing duty policies certainly gives 
developing countries ample reason to be suspicious of potential new avenues for “contingent protection.” 
Given the stridency of the debate, however, there is surprisingly little evidence from existing trade-labor 
linkages to support the fears (Elliott and Freeman 2003, chapter 4). What the labor-friendly Clinton 
administration negotiated in the side agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
and in the US-Jordan free trade agreement (FTA) is actually quite modest (discussed below) and no 
complaint submitted under the NAFTA labor agreement has gone beyond ministerial consultations. Nor 
was the Clinton administration more aggressive than its predecessors in using worker rights as an excuse 
to withdraw developing country trade benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). 
Despite all the rhetoric, the Clinton administration actually did rather little to promote trade-labor 
linkages in practice. This was in part because it could not convince trading partners to accept stronger 
links but it was also because the administration was no more interested in blocking trade than the George 
W. Bush administration (arguably less so in light of the differing approaches to steel imports).  
In sum, core labor standards and globalization are complementary policies that strengthen one 
another and compensate for one another’s weaknesses. Just as globalization can discipline the 
monopolistic tendencies of unions and shine a light on abuses such as forced labor, the core standards can 
encourage a broader distribution of the benefits of globalization than markets alone often produce. The 
opportunities provided by economic and political opening, combined with respect for the core standards, 
can encourage the development of human capital and reassure consumers and reputation-conscious 
foreign investors that conditions are minimally acceptable. In so doing, attention to labor standards issues 
also increases public support for trade agreements.  
 
II. THE CURRENT STATUS OF LABOR STANDARDS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
Table 1 compares Latin America and the Caribbean to other developing regions on readily available 
indicators for three of the four core standards: the incidence of child labor (the percentage of children  
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aged 10-14 that are in the labor force), differences between female and male illiteracy rates (a proxy for 
gender discrimination), and union density. In broad terms, the results are as expected, with the relatively 
higher-income Latin American region having far lower overall illiteracy rates and child labor 
participation rates than sub-Saharan Africa or South Asia. It is more difficult to interpret the figures on 
union density, since one might see higher demand for unions where conditions are bad and lower where 
conditions are good (political repression of unions aside).
9 But it is not surprising that the rates are lower 
in poorer regions with smaller formal sectors.  
Not all the results track income levels so neatly, however. Despite higher per capita incomes, 
child labor rates are as high on average in Latin America as in the developing countries of East Asia and 
the levels in some countries (Brazil, Bolivia, and the Dominican Republic) reach those of South Asia 
(table 2). No matter how gender differences in illiteracy are measured, higher-income Latin America does 
better than other developing regions and, for those countries with available data, there are fewer large 
outliers than for child labor. Despite higher income levels, the Middle East and North Africa do relatively 
poorly on the discrimination measures and, by one calculation, East Asia has the worst record on gender 
literacy differences. There is less comparable cross-country data available on freedom of association 
indicators and forced labor. Overall, however, these measures support the argument that labor standards 
rise with incomes but clearly not in linear fashion. 
  Going beyond these broad regional trends, it is possible to identify the most common or most 
serious labor rights problems in the region using the various reports from the ILO supervisory system.
10 
Potential problems in consistency should be noted here as well, however. As a result of the 1998 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, all ILO members are required to report 
routinely on their laws and practices with respect to the four core standards. But only the reports of those 
countries that have ratified the associated conventions are subjected to systematic scrutiny and comment 
by the ILO’s Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR). 
When the CEACR identifies serious problems, the politically more prominent Conference Committee on 
the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CCACR) may review them and invite the 
country’s government delegate to respond in public session. Similarly, allegations of violations under 
Articles 24 and 26 of the ILO Constitution can generally only be lodged against countries that have 
ratified the relevant convention. The exception to these procedures is freedom of association, which is 
regarded as so fundamental that complaints may be brought against any member, regardless of whether 
                                                 
9 The figure for the Middle East and North Africa should be taken with a large grain of salt as it is based on only 
three countries and would be much lower if data were available for the oil-exporting states of the Middle East. 
10 A broad picture of the application of the core labor standards around the world may also be found in the “global 
reports,” submitted by the director-general each year to the International Labor Conference. Initial reports on 
freedom of association, forced labor, and child labor were released in 2000, 2001, and 2002, respectively, and are 
available on the ILO Web site. The report on discrimination was submitted to the conference in June 2003.   
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they have ratified convention 87 or 98, and these will be referred to the specialized Committee on 
Freedom of Association.
11  
Table 3 summarizes some of the data available from the searchable ILO database on standards 
(ILOLEX). On average, Western Hemisphere nations have ratified 44 of the ILO’s about 180 conventions 
and 7 of the 8 “core” conventions.
12 The countries that have ratified fewer conventions tend to be the 
smaller island nations of the Caribbean and, most notably, the United States. Only tiny St. Kitts and 
Nevis, with a population of 41,000, has ratified fewer conventions overall than the United States but has 
even ratified 7 of the 8 core conventions. The United States, by contrast, has ratified only two core 
conventions—conventions 105 (on the abolition of forced labor) and 182 (on the worst forms of child 
labor). The Clinton administration submitted convention 111 (on nondiscrimination) to the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee for ratification but no vote had been held as of the end of 2002. Unless 
several additional ratifications occur, it seems unlikely the United States will alter its position of seeking 
only the enforcement of national laws, not international standards, when it tries to include labor issues in 
trade agreements (see below). 
Of the two core conventions that the United States has accepted, convention 105 on forced labor 
has been ratified by all 34 FTAA countries, and convention 182 on the worst forms of child labor likely 
will be ratified within a few years. As of fall 2002, convention 182 had only 25 ratifications but was 
gaining new adherents at a rapid pace, globally as well as regionally, and may be the first ILO convention 
to achieve universal ratification. On forced labor, only the United States, Bolivia, and Canada have not 
also ratified convention 29, while convention 138 (setting a minimum age for employment) is the least 
ratified of the eight, regionally and globally. Among those not ratifying 138 but have ratified 182 are 
Canada, Mexico, Paraguay, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and the 
United States. Only Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago have ratified neither. 
On nondiscrimination, only the United States and Suriname have ratified neither convention 100 (on 
equal remuneration) nor convention 111 (on nondiscrimination in employment); in addition, Antigua and 
Barbuda has not ratified convention 100, and Grenada has not ratified convention 111. Finally, only the 
United States and El Salvador have ratified neither convention 87 on freedom of association nor 
convention 98 on the right to organize and bargain collectively; beyond that, only Brazil has not ratified 
convention 87, and Canada and Mexico have not ratified convention 98. 
                                                 
11 The ILO supervisory system is discussed in detail in the FAQs section of the International Labor Standards page 
on the ILO Web site (www.ilo.org). 
12 The conventions in order of adoption are: 29 on forced labor; 87 on freedom of association; 98 on the right to 
organize and bargain collectively; 100 on equal remuneration for men and women for work of equal value; 105 on 
the abolition of forced labor; 111 on nondiscrimination in employment; 138 setting a minimum age for child labor; 
and 182 calling for immediate action against the “worst forms” of child labor.   
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As a first step in assessing compliance, it is obvious that the ILO supervisory system has 
generated far more cases on forced labor and freedom of association issues than on child labor and 
discrimination. This does not necessarily mean that there are fewer problems in these areas. But, 
recognizing that child labor is usually the product of poverty and that no country has clean hands when it 
comes to discrimination, CEACR comments on the applications of these conventions are generally 
promotional in nature, reminding countries what their obligations are under the conventions and asking 
for information on implementation. The ILO has also substantially beefed up its technical assistance 
programs for child labor, especially to promote compliance with convention 182 on the worst forms, 
which include forced labor and illicit activities, such as prostitution, pornography, and drug-trafficking. 
At least with respect to countries in the Western Hemisphere, child labor and discrimination are rarely 
brought before the conference committee, which focuses attention on the more serious problems 
identified by the CEACR each year, and these areas are also rarely the subject of Article 24 complaints.  
Indeed, in 12 years from 1990 through 2001, there was not a single complaint against a Western 
Hemisphere country alleging violations of the minimum age for child labor, again for reasons of efficacy 
and not because no violations occurred. As found in most studies, however, available data show that child 
labor in the region is broadly correlated with poverty, with the highest labor participation rates by those 
between 10 and 14 years in Haiti, Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, 
and Brazil. Interestingly, however, and suggesting that there is scope for policy measures other than just 
economic growth to address the problem, simple correlation coefficients show a closer (negative) 
relationship between child labor and democracy (as measured by the Freedom House rankings) than 
between child labor and per capita income. 
Discrimination, which is rooted in history, culture, and institutions, is also generally treated by 
the ILO as an area in which promotional measures are preferred. CEACR observations and “direct 
requests” typically relate to the need for additional information, especially statistical data on relative 
levels of employment and wages of women and men, as well as what plans the government has to achieve 
the goals of the conventions. The most common requests from the experts in the 1990s related to 
clarification as to whether national laws on equal remuneration are consistent with the goal of “equal 
wages for work of equal value” rather than the lesser standard of equal pay for equal work. Several 
countries were also asked to provide information on vocational training for women, as a means of 
achieving the goals of nondiscrimination in employment and remuneration. In a few cases, explicit 
discrimination in labor laws or collective bargaining contracts have been identified by the CEACR and, 
usually, rectified. 
Both the most frequent and serious allegations in the hemisphere relate to freedom of association 
and forced labor. From 1990 through 2001, there were 314 Article 24 complaints against Western  
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Hemisphere countries; of those, 312 related to alleged violations of freedom of association and the other 
two to forced labor (in Brazil and Guatemala). These cases can be on relatively technical grounds and the 
numbers reflect complaints, not whether any ILO body confirmed a violation. Individual observations by 
the conference committee, however, are reserved for relatively more serious and substantiated problems 
and over the same period, there were 86 of these regarding countries in the Americas and the Caribbean, 
93 percent relating to either freedom of association or forced labor, mostly the former. Of the 34 FTAA 
countries, 14 were not the subject of an individual observation and most others were the subject of just a 
few. Six countries were the subject of more than five observations, with only Brazil and Colombia 
reaching double digits.  
Colombia, because of the many murders of union organizers and members during its civil 
conflict, is the only Latin American country in recent years to be the subject of an Article 26 
investigation, a procedure reserved for the gravest violations. This case fits the pattern of the most serious 
allegations, which typically involve situations of conflict and political repression and weak or nonexistent 
democracy. In the 1970s, when the human rights situation deteriorated in a number of Latin American 
countries, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Uruguay were all the subject of Article 26 investigations, usually 
involving conventions 87 and 98. In recent years, in addition to Colombia, the most serious problems with 
freedom of association have been in Venezuela and Guatemala. Peru has actually been the most frequent 
target of freedom of association complaints over the past decade or so, mostly issues related to anti-union 
discrimination and restrictions on collective bargaining or the right to strike but without the levels of 
violence seen in Colombia. Table 3 also shows large numbers of freedom of association complaints 
against Argentina and Canada, democratic countries where unions are relatively strong. In Canada, the 
primary role of the provinces in regulating labor markets also boosts the number of cases filed. 
Beyond the most serious allegations of violence against and political repression of union 
organizers, common complaints include the failure of governments to punish anti-union discrimination by 
employers, including dismissals, and restrictions on the right to strike. Also common are complaints about 
administrative impediments to establishing and organizing unions that workers freely choose (regulations 
on the proportion or absolute number of workers required to register a union, restrictions on the 
nationality of officers, and preferential treatment of employer-established worker associations, i.e., 
“company unions”). Among the most common complaints and sources of comment by the CEACR are 
restrictions on the right of public employees to organize, bargain collectively, and strike (for example, by 
defining “essential services” too broadly). 
With respect to forced labor, the most serious but least common allegations involve debt bondage, 
deceptive recruiting practices, and other forms of coerced labor, mainly among indigenous peoples—in  
  13
plantation agriculture, forestry, and mining—in Brazil, Paraguay, and Peru.
13 There are also problems 
with forced child labor in domestic service in Haiti, and, earlier in the 1990s, forced labor by (often 
illegal) Haitians on Dominican Republic sugar plantations. More frequently in this area, one finds 
CEACR reports asking for clarification or technical corrections to laws that countries claim are not 
enforced—for example, restrictions on leaving public service, particularly the military and police, and 
maritime services. A number of CEACR observations relate to prison labor—under what conditions the 
work occurs, including whether it is for private profit, and for what offenses (for example, to punish 
political dissent or unauthorized strikes). 
  Beyond the core standards, the most common complaints relate to health and safety issues, which 
are probably among the most common globally, and to respect for the rights of indigenous peoples, which 
may be a bigger problem in the Western Hemisphere than elsewhere. 
To sum up, in terms of ratification of the core conventions in the region, it is close enough to 
universal to suggest that the US position of asking countries to agree to enforce their own laws would 
approximate a commitment to international standards for most of the region. Ironically, it is the United 
States that is the clear outlier on ratification, if not on compliance with the broad principles embodied in 
the standards. Unlike some other countries that view convention ratification as a statement of an 
aspiration to comply, the United States will not ratify a convention until it determines that its law is 
consistent. At this stage, the government seems unwilling to change US labor laws in ways that would 
allow it to ratify additional conventions, except possibly for convention 111 (on nondiscrimination). 
Convention 29 (on forced labor) is a problem because of the trend toward prison privatization and private-
sector employment of prison labor for commercial production. Although a variety of inconsistencies 
between US law and practice and the provisions of conventions 87 and 98 (on association rights) have 
been alleged, among the most important are sectoral exclusions from collective bargaining rights, 
particularly in the public sector, and various restrictions on the right to strike, including a legal provision 
allowing employers to hire permanent strike worker replacements, which the ILO has concluded 
undermines the right to strike.
14 US practice is probably in broad compliance with convention 100 (on 
equal remuneration), but the refusal by Congress to enact comparable worth pay legislation would make it 
politically difficult to ratify this convention. With respect to convention 138 (setting a minimum age for 
child labor), US practice is again broadly in compliance, but the diversity of state laws in this area, 
                                                 
13 These problems are also rooted in discrimination but the complaints are usually addressed under the forced labor 
conventions.  
14 As it is wont to do, the Committee on Freedom of Association used far more circumspect language, concluding 
that the use of permanent strike replacement workers, “entails a risk of derogation from the right to strike which may 
affect the free exercise of trade union rights.” See Potter (1984) for an employers’ group perspective on the changes 
to US law that would be required by ratification of conventions 87 and 98 and the Human Rights Watch report 
(Compa 2000) on how US law and practice fails to protect workers.  
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combined with the relatively technical nature of this convention, make it difficult to bring US law into 
compliance. This situation of few US ratifications leads to charges of hypocrisy and effectively rules out 
any language in the FTAA agreement that would condition membership on compliance with international 
labor standards. 
In terms of compliance with the core standards, problems could arise to haunt governments and 
employers in the region if they are not addressed more vigorously and systematically. A comparison of 
the top ten exports of each FTAA country with the sectors cited in ILO supervisory documents shows that 
most countries in the hemisphere are potentially vulnerable to a worker rights scandal that could hit key 
exports (table 4).
15 In particular, the allegations of forced and child labor in plantation agriculture and 
other natural resource sectors and of repression of freedom of association in export processing zones 
(EPZs) are serious and could become more visible with increased integration. The pressure on Ecuador in 
late 2002 to address labor problems on its banana plantations, as a condition of gaining eligibility for 
expanded US trade preferences, is one example. In addition, the AFL-CIO has already announced that it 
will focus closely on labor standards compliance during free trade area negotiations between the United 
States and Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) in 2003–04. 
 
III. RECENT PRECEDENTS FOR LINKING LABOR STANDARDS AND TRADE 
 
In fall 2001, the US Congress approved the US-Jordan FTA with enforceable labor (and environmental) 
standards in the main body of the agreement. In August 2002, it passed “trade promotion authority” that 
incorporates labor issues as negotiating objectives and endorses “equivalent” dispute settlement 
procedures and remedies. In spring 2003, President George W. Bush and US Trade Representative Robert 
Zoellick signed bilateral trade agreements with Singapore and Chile, respectively. These agreements have 
labor standards in the main text, subject to the same dispute settlement procedures as commercial 
disputes, but with fines rather than trade measures as the principal enforcement mechanism. While the 
Bush administration is not suggesting that the same mechanisms are necessarily appropriate in all other 
trade negotiation, they are being used as the basis for negotiations with Central America, and they clearly 
make it more difficult for negotiators to completely delink trade and labor issues in future negotiations.  
Two key questions typically arise in discussions over how to address labor issues during trade 
negotiations (if they are addressed at all). First, should labor issues be in the main body of an agreement 
text; in a supplementary or “side” agreement; or should they be addressed in parallel negotiations 
delinked from trade negotiations? Second, should trade measures be available to enforce labor standards, 
                                                 
15 Most FTAA countries have been the target of Committee of Experts observations on laws or practices that are 
inconsistent with international core standards, but only the more serious cases are included in table 4.  
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as they are in other commercial disputes? Existing agreements answer these questions in a variety of ways 
(see table 5). The only common element is that each agreement requires only that the parties to it enforce 
their own national labor laws, with no requirement that those laws be consistent with the core labor 
standards as defined by the ILO. This is an unfortunate feature of these agreements because it undercuts 
the international consensus that has been reached on the core standards, and it could discourage 
improvements in local law. But as noted, it is unlikely to change as long as the United States has ratified 
so few ILO core conventions. 
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) and Canada-Chile and Canada-
Costa Rica FTAs all have side agreements on labor issues with their own institutional structures and 
dispute settlement resolution mechanisms. The labor provisions in the Canada-Costa Rica FTA authorize 
ministerial consultations on labor issues but include no enforcement mechanism. The other two 
agreements provide for ministerial consultations on a list of 11 labor standards, including all the core 
standards, but authorize monetary fines as a last resort only for child labor and technical standards 
relating to wages and health and safety conditions. In the case of a bilateral dispute between the United 
States and Mexico, bilateral tariff concessions can be withdrawn to the extent necessary to collect the 
value of the fine, but this provision is not regarded as authorizing trade sanctions. Under these 
agreements, disputes will be referred for dispute settlement only if there is a “persistent pattern” of 
failures to enforce relevant labor laws and if the violations are in trade-related sectors.
16 
The US-Jordan FTA, completed in late 2000 and approved in fall 2001, includes a section on 
labor in the main text that is subject to the same dispute settlement procedures as the rest of the 
agreement. The principal risks in this model, however, arise from the vague language of the dispute 
settlement procedures, not from the language on labor standards. At the end of the day, if consultations, a 
dispute settlement panel, and the joint committee created to implement the agreement do not result in 
resolution of a dispute, the complaining party is authorized “to take any appropriate and commensurate 
measure” (emphasis added). But the labor standards text is so weak, it seems unlikely that any dispute 
would get that far. Most paragraphs in this section require only that the parties “strive to ensure” that 
domestic laws are consistent with “internationally recognized labor rights,” and that they do not “waive or 
otherwise derogate from … such laws as an encouragement for trade….” The only “shall” in the labor 
text refers to the obligation of the parties to “not fail to effectively enforce its laws,” on a sustained basis 
in a way that affects trade. But other paragraphs in that section preserve the discretion of governments to 
adopt, modify, and enforce labor laws and regulations so that a party will be in compliance with its labor  
 
 
                                                 
16 See Hufbauer et al. (2002) for a more detailed description and assessment of the NAFTA side agreement.  
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obligations under the agreement if: 
 
a course of action or inaction [in enforcing labor laws] reflects a reasonable 
exercise of such discretion, or results from a bona fide decision regarding the 
allocation of resources” (section 4(b) of Article 6 of the agreement). 
 
It is certainly conceivable that a protectionist American president could abuse this language, but there is 
no evidence from US implementation of worker conditionality in the GSP or the side agreement to 
NAFTA to suggest that is remotely likely.
17 
During the congressional debate over trade promotion authority, then Senate Finance Committee 
Chair Max Baucus (D-MT) insisted that all future trade agreements should meet the “Jordan standard” of 
having enforceable labor standards in the main text. Since passage of the Trade Act of 2002, Baucus and 
other Democrats have continued to assert that this is the interpretation of the labor provisions that US 
Trade Representative Robert Zoellick should follow. Current Senate Finance Committee Chair Charles 
Grassley (R-IA) is equally adamant that this is a misinterpretation of congressional intent. 
The only thing that seems reasonably clear in mid-2003 is that it will be difficult for US trade 
negotiators to ignore labor issues entirely. In the section of the Trade Act providing trade promotion 
authority, references to worker rights and labor standards appear as an “overall” and a “principal” trade 
negotiating objective, as well as one of several other priorities that the president should promote “in order 
to address and maintain” US competitiveness. The key section, 2102(b)(11), essentially copies the 
language from the US-Jordan agreement in defining principal US negotiating objectives with respect to 
labor (and the environment), emphasizing the legitimacy of discretion in setting and enforcing one’s own 
laws. 
In an amendment that muddies the enforceability question, however, Senator Phil Gramm (R-
TX), a leading linkage opponent, convinced his House colleagues to insert additional language barring 
retaliation “based on the exercise of these rights [to discretion in enforcement] or the right to establish 
domestic labor standards….” Gramm’s intent has variously been reported as taking sanctions off the table 
for enforcing labor and environmental standards or preventing a trade agreement being used to change US 
labor (or environmental) laws. Moreover, the interpretation of this provision is further complicated by the 
next negotiating objective on the list, which requires US negotiators to “seek provisions” that treat all the 
“principal negotiating objectives equally with respect to” the availability of “equivalent dispute settlement 
procedures and remedies.” 
In its first attempt to interpret this potentially conflicting language, the USTR office devised a 
clever and creative compromise for the bilateral FTA negotiations with Chile and Singapore. The 
                                                 
17 See Elliott and Freeman (2003, chapter 4) on GSP and Hufbauer et al. (2002) on the NAFTA side agreement.  
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provisions in these agreements are similar and are based on a combination of the NAALC and the US-
Jordan agreement. Like NAALC, the new proposal would follow the practice of basing labor-related 
obligations on the effective enforcement of each country’s own laws in trade-related sectors. It would 
also, like NAALC, authorize monetary fines in the case of unresolved disputes over covered labor issues, 
allow the suspension of tariff concessions if necessary to collect the fine (explicitly not a sanction), and 
cap the fine at a level to be negotiated. Like the US-Jordan agreement, however, labor obligations would 
be included in the main text of the agreements, violations would be subject to the same dispute settlement 
procedures as commercial disputes, and, unlike NAALC, there would be no distinction among applicable 
labor standards and the fines would continue to accrue annually if the problem remains unresolved. In 
commercial disputes, the country in violation of the agreement could choose to pay a fine, but traditional 
trade retaliation would also remain an option. USTR officials argue that while not “mirror images,” the 
mechanisms for enforcement of labor and commercial disputes would be equally effective and would, 
therefore, meet the congressional standard of equivalence.  
 
IV. WHERE’S THE BEEF? 
 
It is almost certainly no coincidence that the agreements explicitly linking trade and labor issues that have 
been reached or proposed so far (with the exception of Mexico) are with relatively small trading partners 
with little negotiating leverage and relatively good labor standards. The agreements with Jordan, 
Singapore, and Chile set a precedent in terms of bilateral FTAs, and they provide an opening to discuss 
labor issues with trading partners. But it is not clear that they will be used as examples of how labor 
standards can be improved under globalization. Moreover, larger trading partners and developing country 
blocs are less susceptible to US pressure and are unlikely to be as accommodating, so that even less is 
likely to be achieved on labor issues in the FTAA or WTO negotiations than in these bilateral agreements.  
Workers, labor rights supporters, and other activists nevertheless try to link the issues they care 
about to issues, like trade, that corporations and governments care strongly about because that is the only 
way they can get a hearing. Labor activists are also right to be suspicious of parallel tracks because the 
support for them to date has been mostly rhetorical. USTR Zoellick recently proposed increasing the 
funding for trade capacity building by a third overall, with $140 million allocated just for the Western 
Hemisphere (Inside U.S. Trade, November 8, 2002, 23). This is nearly twice the $86 million requested for 
the Department of Labor’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs for FY2003, which funds the entire US  
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budget for technical assistance on labor. Moreover, this figure is a substantial cut from the peak of $150 
million under the Clinton administration.
18 
  Nevertheless, pushing to increase technical assistance and use it more productively is at least 
consistent with how the Bush administration and most developing-country governments around the world 
say they want to approach labor standards issues. This more positive attitude is in stark contrast with the 
consistent opposition to the use of trade sanctions to enforce labor standards. This suggests there may be 
more scope for progress in holding the Bush administration to its promises to create a separate “tool box” 
for labor standards than in continuing to try to block the international trade agenda by insisting on an 
enforceable linkage to labor issues. This is particularly true now that the Doha round of multilateral trade 
negotiations has been launched and President Bush has trade promotion authority from Congress. A 
change in strategy of this kind should also be more appealing to workers and governments in the rest of 
the hemisphere that are concerned about the potential for protectionist abuse of trade sanctions to enforce 
labor standards clauses. It would thereby facilitate a broadening of the coalition in favor of doing 
something serious to promote higher labor standards and better compliance throughout the region. 
The first focus of efforts to make the parallel track for labor issues credible should be to pressure 
donor countries and the multilateral development agencies to put money on the table. Equally important, 
NGOs, unions, and other elements of civil society need to continue play an oversight role and agitate as 
necessary to ensure that the money is used effectively. The “plan of action” agreed to at the 12
th 
conference of Inter-American labor ministers in Ottawa in October 2001 has one brief paragraph calling 
on member states to “devote the necessary and available” economic resources needed to implement the 
plan. But the plan of action primarily calls for more working groups, more studies, and more technical 
workshops, to build on the working groups, studies, and workshops conducted under the plan of action 
adopted at the 11
th conference of ministers held three years earlier. And, finally, a meaningful parallel 
track for labor should harness the energies of all the relevant actors—not just the governments and 
international organizations, but civil society and the private sector as well. 
The obvious starting point for designing a real plan of action, following what environmentalists 
have suggested, is to prepare systematic “national assessments” to help governments—and workers and 
other citizens—to understand and prepare for the labor market adjustments that will be required by the 
FTAA. The Hemispheric Cooperation Program approved at the Quito Ministerial in October 2002 calls 
on countries seeking assistance to “develop national or regional strategies” identifying areas where their 
capacity to participate in the FTAA is inadequate, including in the area of “adjusting to integration.” This 
could be a hook for addressing technical assistance needs in the labor area as well. But it would be useful, 
                                                 
18 Although each Bush budget since he entered office has proposed cuts in funding for international labor affairs, 
Congress has thus far maintained spending at roughly the levels of the last years of the Clinton administration.  
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first, to have a baseline picture of the application of the core labor standards across the region, perhaps 
prepared by the ILO regional office, against which requests for technical assistance could be compared. In 
addition, since the implications for workers of hemispheric integration go well beyond standards issues, it 
would also be useful to have some external oversight, perhaps by the Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), of government’s own assessments of the likely sectoral and 
regional effects in order to ensure that adequate provision is being made for safety net and other 
adjustment programs. Apparently some of this is being done on an ad hoc basis, but a more systematic 
effort is needed to identify and prepare for the potentially large adjustments that will be required. 
  Second, while recognizing that the worst labor abuses are typically not in export sectors, the ILO 
and human rights groups have identified problems with child labor and forced labor in commercial 
agriculture and mining in some countries and with freedom of association and discrimination in the 
garment and other manufacturing sectors, especially in EPZs. Programs to address labor violations in 
those sectors could have several benefits. They could be designed to build capacity in ways that would be 
generally applicable; they might also generate other spillovers as examples of best practice in labor 
relations; and they would help to broaden public support for the FTAA.  
In addition to getting money on the table and meaningful action plans in place, the labor track 
needs to involve all the relevant actors. In improving labor standards compliance in EPZs, for example, 
civil society and the private sector can play important roles. With increasing global integration, 
consumers in Northern countries are increasingly aware of and concerned about the conditions under 
which products they consume are made. In turn, most major retailers and importing firms in certain 
industries (especially clothing, footwear, and a few food products) are now aware that their brand 
reputations are at risk if their goods are exposed as being produced under abusive conditions. As a result, 
a number of multi-stakeholder initiatives and social auditing firms—some for profit, some nonprofit—
have emerged to fill the demand for monitoring of codes of conduct.
19 
  As of mid-2003, however, only 36 of 258 facilities certified by Social Accountability 
International (SAI) were in Latin America, all but two in Brazil. There were only five (of 14) auditors 
accredited by the Fair Labor Association (FLA) operating in the Western Hemisphere. The volume of 
monitoring activities in Central America and the Caribbean should increase as the FLA, which focuses on 
the garment and footwear sectors, gets fully up and running.
20 Other manufacturing sectors could be 
encouraged to seek certification under SAI’s SA 8000 code, which is not sector-specific. But, while 
                                                 
19 For more on the monitoring initiatives and the “market for standards,” see Elliott and Freeman (2003, chapters 2 
and 3). 
20 The FLA released its first public monitoring reports in June 2003, available at www.fairlabor.org. It is also 
working on a Central America project to address alleged problems with freedom of association in that region. See 
Fair Labor Association Update, June 2003.  
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Chiquita recently had its banana operations in Costa Rica certified under the SA8000 code, and both SAI 
and the UK-based Ethical Trade Initiative are doing pilot projects on how to monitor code compliance by 
agricultural facilities, none of the code of conduct initiatives adequately deals with this sector. 
While these initiatives are expanding as a result of market forces, the public sector could also 
encourage the process. The Organization of American States or ECLAC could sponsor workshops in 
areas with concentrations of EPZs or labor-intensive agricultural operations to inform them about the 
major monitoring initiatives and how social auditing works. The Inter-American Development Bank 
could also stimulate the market for monitors by requiring social audits on projects that it funds where 
labor violations are a potential problem. In the interim, while private-sector monitoring capacity is being 
built, the ILO, at the request of concerned governments, might supplement local inspection resources as it 
is currently doing in Cambodia (Elliott and Freeman 2003, chapter 6). But if the ILO is asked to do more, 
its financial and operational capacity will also have to be strengthened. 
  In sum, the way forward in the FTAA involves taking steps to ensure not just that the labor and 
trade tracks are parallel but also that the trains on them run at roughly similar speeds. For that to happen, 
workers and labor activists need to keep the pressure on but need to shift their attention from sanctions to 
enforce standards in trade agreements to pressuring governments to adopt concrete, real plans of action 
for raising labor standards and to provide the financial resources to implement them.  
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  Table 1   Latin America in comparative perspective, 2000  
Union
Percentage  membership
of children Adult as a GNI per
aged 10-14 illiteracy Difference percent of capita
 in the rate (percentage the non-ag. (US$, Atlas
labor force (percent) Ratio      points) labor force method)
Latin America and Caribbean 8.2 11.6 1.2 1.8 15.9 3,560
Middle East and North Africa 4.4 35.2 1.9 21.1 20.7
b
2,000
East Asia and Pacific
a
8.2 14.5 2.6 13.1 10.1
c
900
Sub-Saharan Africa 29.0 38.5 1.6 16.5 13.8 470
South Asia 15.0 45.2 1.7 23.4 5.1 450
a.  Excludes developed countries, South Korea, and Taiwan.
b.  Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco only; most of the undemocratic oil-exporting regimes restrict or ban unions.
c.  Excludes China's misleading 55 percent; includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators database.
Differences in
female and male
illiteracy ratesTable 2   Labor outcomes, economic, and political indicators, 1995
Percent of Female/male Union membership as percent of: Formal sector
children aged illiteracy rates Non-ag. Formal sector as percent of GDP per Freedom
10-14 in the (percentage labor force wage earners total non-ag. Population capita House
Country labor force points) employment (thousands) (dollars) rank
b
Antigua/Barbuda n.a. n.a. n.a. 53.8
a
n.a. 65 6,930 4.5
Argentina 4.5 0.1 25.4 65.6 50.7 34,768 8,030 5.5
Bahamas 0.0 -1.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 278 11,830 6.5
Barbados 0.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 264 6,590 7.0
Belize 2.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 217 2,650 7.0
Bolivia 14.4 14.7 16.4 59.7 n.a. 7,414 870 5.5
Brazil 16.1 0.5 32.1 66.0 53.5 159,346 3,690 5.0
Canada 0.0 n.a. 31.0 37.4
a
n.a. 29,615 19,460 7.0
Chile 0.0 0.5 15.9 33.0 61.2 14,210 3,880 6.0
Colombia 6.6 0.3 7.0 17.0 44.4 38,542 1,880 4.0
Costa Rica 5.5 -0.1 13.1 27.3 56.7 3,374 2,570 6.5
Dominica n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 73 2,900 7.0
Dominican Republic 16.1 0.7 17.3 n.a. n.a. 7,823 1,430 5.0
Ecuador 5.4 4.2 9.8 22.4 36.3 11,460 1,400 5.5
El Salvador 15.1 6.2 7.2 10.7 n.a. 5,669 1,570 5.0
Grenada n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 95 2,830 6.5
Guatemala 16.2 15.4 4.4 7.7 n.a. 9,976 1,400 4.0
Guyana 0.0 1.5 25.2 n.a. n.a. 830 620 2.0
Haiti 25.3 5.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. 7,168 300 1.5
Honduras 8.5 1.2 4.5 20.8 42.9 5,654 670 5.0
Jamaica 0.1 -8.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2,522 1,570 5.5
Mexico 6.7 4.6 31.0 72.9 56.8 91,145 3,800 4.0
Nicaragua 14.0 0.1 23.4 48.2 n.a. 4,426 360 4.0
Panama 3.5 1.3 14.2 29.0 62.9 2,631 2,950 5.5
Paraguay 7.9 3.1 9.3 50.1 n.a. 4,828 1,740 4.5
Peru 2.5 10.8 7.5 18.3 44.9 23,532 2,320 3.5
St. Kitts and Nevis n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 41 5,500 6.5
St. Lucia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 156 3,400 6.5
St. Vincent and the Grenadines n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 111 2,320 6.5
Suriname 0.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 409 880 5.0
Trinidad and Tobago 0.0 1.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,287 3,780 6.5
United States 0.0 n.a. 12.7 14.2
a
n.a. 262,761 27,410 7.0
Uruguay 2.1 -0.8 11.6 20.2 56.7 3,218 5,120 6.5
Venezuela 0.9 1.2 14.9 32.6 55.5 21,844 3,040 5.0
Average 6.2 2.7 15.9 35.3 51.9 22,228 4,285 5.4
a.  All wage and salary earners. b. The Freedom House Rank has been recalculated so that 1 indicates unfree and 7 indicates free.
Sources:  World Bank, World Development Indicators; ILO 1997; Freedom House, Freedom in the World database.
(select years 1992–95)Table 3  Evidence on the formal implementation of core labor standards
Observations Number of
ILO  Core on core freedom of
conventionsconventions conventions association
ratified ratified by CCACR
a 
complaints
Country (Fall 2002) (Fall 2002) (1990–2001) (1990–2001)
Antigua/Barbuda 27 7 0 0
Argentina 71 8 1 33
Bahamas 33 8 0 2
Barbados 39 8 0 1
Belize 42 8 0 1
Bolivia 46 6 4 2
Brazil 89 7 12 11
Canada 30 5 1 33
Chile 59 8 1 10
Colombia 59 7 13 25
Costa Rica 50 8 4 16
Dominica 23 8 0 0
Dominican Republic 35 8 5 5
Ecuador 59 8 5 14
El Salvador 25 6 1 11
Grenada 28 5 0 0
Guatemala 72 8 8 21
Guyana 46 8 0 0
Haiti 23 6 1 5
Honduras 22 8 2 5
Jamaica 26 6 1 0
Mexico 78 6 1 9
Nicaragua 59 8 0 12
Panama 74 8 7 9
Paraguay 36 7 3 13
Peru 69 8 9 37
St. Kitts and Nevis 8 7
– –
St. Lucia 28 7 1 0
St.Vincent and the Grenadines 21 7 0
–
Suriname 28 4 0 0
Trinidad and Tobago 16 6 0 0
United States 14 2 0 3
Uruguay 103 8 0 8
Venezuela 53 7 6 26
Average 44 7 3 10
– = Indicates conventions ratifies in 1998–2001 and no reports yet reviewed.
a. Numbers refer to comments on core conventions only.  Individual observations by the ILO Conference
Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CCACR) are reserved for the more serious 
or long-standing problems identified by the Committee of Experts on the Applications of Conventions and 













Argentina  FOA case  Petroleum 
Bolivia  CC observation on FOA 
FOA case  
Agriculture 
Mining 
Brazil  CC observation on forced      
    labor 
FOA cases 
Agriculture 
Automotive vehicles and    
   parts                              
Citrus 
Chile  FOA case  Agriculture 
Colombia  CC observations and FOA    








Cement, glass, and ceramics 
Textiles and apparel 
Coffee 
Costa Rica  CC observations and FOA cases 




Equador  CC observation and FOA case 






El Salvador  FOA cases  Coffee 
EPZs—apparel  









Haiti  FOA case  Apparel 
Honduras  FOA case  EPZs—apparel  
Mexico  FOA case  Petroleum 
Nicaragua  FOA cases  Bananas 
EPZs (apparel) 
Panama  CC observation on FOA  EPZs 
Paraguay  FOA case  Meat 
Peru  CC observations on forced labor, 
FOA and FOA cases 
CC observation on forced labor 
FOA cases 
Gold mining 




Uruguay  FOA case  Dairy 
Venezuela  CC observations and FOA cases  Petroleum and products 
 
a.  Only Conference Committee (CC) observations, freedom of association (FOA) cases, and Article 24 and 
26 complaints are included.  Countries not listed have not come under these types of scrutiny. 
b.  Only the top ten export sectors, based on the average value in 1996-2000 for each country, are included. 
 
Sources:  International Labor Organization, ILOLEX database (online); UNCTAD/WTO International Trade 
Center, trade database (online). Table 5   Approaches to linking trade and labor standards 
 
Approach  Pros  Cons 
Social clause in trade agreements 
authorizing trade measures: 

















Not appropriate since most labor 
violations in non-traded sectors and trade 
experts not competent to resolve labor 
standards disputes 
 
A political nonstarter for the foreseeable 
future 
 
US-Jordan FTA: Labor standards in main 
text  
 
Treats trade-related labor 
standards violations equally with 
other potential distortions of trade 
and investment flows 
Labor language so weak as to exert little 
upward pressure on labor standards 
 
Vague dispute settlement provisions risk 
abuse by leaving too much discretion to 
individual governments 
 
NAALC:  Side agreement on labor 
 
Provides mechanism for problems 
to be investigated and discussed, 
enforcement with fines possible 
for technical labor issues and 
child labor 
 
Creates tiers for labor standards that is 
inconsistent with international consensus 
on core labor standards 
 
Provisions requiring only enforcement of 
national laws provides disincentive to 
raise standards 
 
Canada-Chile FTA:   
Side agreement on labor 
 
Similar to above  Same as above 
 
Relies on local judiciary to enforce, which 
could be problematic in less developed 
countries 
 
Chile and Singapore bilateral 
agreements:  Labor standards in main 
text 
 
Provides for “equivalent,” though 
not identical, dispute settlement 
procedures 
 
Does not distinguish among the 
core labor standards 
 
Not clear how the fines would be 
collected or how they would be used and, 
therefore, whether they would be likely to 
contribute to improved working conditions 
 
Making only enforcement of national laws 
subject to dispute resolution provides 
disincentive to raise standards 
 
 
 
 